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Abstract : 
 
"Russia and its main gas company Gazprom, essential suppliers for the European gas market, 
are today at the centre of the debate surrounding the security of the European Union’s gas 
supply. A variety of factors have focussed interest on the question of Gazprom’s industrial 
strategies and more precisely :the Gazprom’s ability to meet its future contractual 
commitments. The gas market liberalisation in Europe is bringing about some significant 
changes in the relations (especially contractual ones) that the EU had established with its main 
natural gas suppliers. The aim of this paper is to throw some light on how European gas 
market liberalisation is affecting and changing the strategies of one of the EU’s essential gas 
suppliers, namely Russia. The export policies developed by Gazprom are however largely 
conditioned by the particular characteristics (essentially institutional) of its domestic market, 
not only in terms of supply and demand but also prices". It is important to take into account 
this aspect in order to understand the Russian gas export strategy". 
 
 
 
 
Résumé :  
 
Les principales caractéristiques de la stratégie d’exportation de gaz naturel de la compagnie 
gazière russe Gazprom sur le marché européen sont une réponse aux incertitudes (volumes, 
prix) créées par la libéralisation du marché gazier de l’UE. La politique d’acquisition d’actifs 
menée depuis la fin des années 1980, la multiplication des réseaux d’exportation mais aussi la 
volonté de maintenir des contrats de long terme tout en profitant de nouvelles opportunités 
contractuelles en sont des illustrations. Mais les stratégies industrielles et commerciales que 
peut développer l’entreprise gazière sont en partie déterminées par les caractéristiques de son 
marché intérieur (bas prix du gaz, quotas de consommation). En l’absence d’un véritable 
marché gazier intérieur, de fortes contraintes pèsent sur la capacité de production et donc 
d’exportation de Gazprom. Par conséquent, les « relations gazières » entre la Russie et l’UE - 
la sécurité gazière de celle-ci mais aussi la capacité de la Russie à exercer un réel pouvoir de 
marché en Europe - dépendront largement de la capacité de la Russie à réformer son marché 
intérieur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
----- 
 
 
 
Disponible en version française sous le titre Les stratégies d’exportation de Gazprom sous la 
contrainte institutionnelle du marché gazier russe. Cahier de recherche n° 6, février 2008.  
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Russia and its main gas company Gazprom, essential suppliers for the European gas market, 
are today at the centre of the debate surrounding the security of the European Union’s gas 
supply. A variety of factors have focussed interest on the question of Gazprom’s industrial 
strategies and its market power in Europe: fears expressed about Gazprom’s ability to meet its 
future contractual commitments in light of changes in its production capacity, the possibility 
of the EU’s main suppliers forming a “gas OPEC” (OGEP), and Gazprom’s attempts to 
acquire European companies. These questions concerning Russia’s gas policy with respect to 
the EU are being raised against a background of two important changes. First, the growing 
role of the State in the gas sector and in the energy sector as a whole in Russia suggests that it 
will be increasingly difficult for international oil companies to gain access to Russian 
hydrocarbon resources. Second, gas market liberalisation in Europe is bringing about some 
significant changes in the relations (especially contractual ones) that the EU had established 
with its main natural gas suppliers (most of which are in fact outside the EU). 
 
The aim of this paper is to throw some light on how European gas market liberalisation is 
affecting and changing the strategies of one of the EU’s essential gas suppliers, namely 
Russia. The paper will analyse the different policies developed by Gazprom, both industrial 
and commercial (that is to say contractual), in order to deal with the institutional changes in 
its main export market and maintain its market shares.  
 
The export policies developed by Gazprom are however largely conditioned by the particular 
characteristics (essentially institutional) of its domestic market, not only in terms of supply 
and demand but also prices. In the medium term, in the absence of a real domestic gas market, 
strong constraints are hindering Gazprom’s production capacity and therefore its export 
capacity. Completion of domestic gas price reform (in particular the rate at which reform is 
implemented) is at the heart of the problem of the gas industry, at least where two factors are 
concerned. First, price reform will be a decisive variable in the rate of increase not only in 
demand but also in supply of Russian gas, and consequently in its export capacity. Second, by 
improving the profitability of Gazprom’s domestic market, price reform will give the 
company greater flexibility in its export strategies. Consequently, “gas relations” between 
Russia and the EU – gas supply security for the EU but also Russia’s ability to exert real 
market power in Europe – will depend to a great extent on Russia’s ability to reform its 
domestic market.  
 
I – Gazprom’s new export strategies in response to European gas market liberalisation 
 
Where gas is concerned, the relationship between the EU and Russia is characterised by 
interdependence. Exports of Russian gas to Europe in 2006 totalled 161.5 Bcm excluding the 
Baltic countries1 (of which 137.1 Bcm went to the EU27). Russian gas represents 23% of gas 
supplies to the EU27. In the medium term, Russia should maintain its position as a major 
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supplier of gas to Europe with exports that could, according to Russia’s long term energy plan 
drawn up in 2003, amount to 200 Bcm in 2020 (180 Bcm in 2015 according to recent 
statements by A. Medvedev2). 
 
These gas relations, which were created under the Soviet Union, were essentially structured 
by long-term contracts (Take or Pay).  Contracts of this type link a gas producer directly with 
each of the big import monopolies of the EU States and at the same time allow for the risks 
(related to volume and price) to be shared between buyer and seller. Generally speaking, the 
liberalisation of the EU market – greater competition among suppliers, development of spot 
markets and short-term transactions – is likely to increase exposure of the EU’s traditional gas 
suppliers to “price risk” and “volume risk”. In this environment of greater uncertainty, these 
suppliers are attempting to develop a number of strategies to ensure a secure position in the 
market. 
 
1.1 Industrial strategies based on acquisition of assets 
 
- Downstream integration 
 
In order to secure its market shares (or outlets) in a liberalised market a supplier must acquire 
a presence downstream, which will give it access to final consumers. Through a policy of 
buying assets in gas transmission and distribution companies and even in large gas consumers 
(case of electricity sector), gas suppliers can place their resources without having to compete 
with other gas producers in a wholesale market (Eikeland, 2007). In terms of prices, in a 
seller’s market, a producer who can develop a position downstream in the chain can capture 
the profit margins obtained by retailers.  
 
Gazprom’s policy of acquiring assets, which it has been doing since the end of the 1980s, fits 
into this framework since its clear aim is to gain access to final users. Gazprom has thus set 
itself the goal of obtaining a 10% direct share of the French market as well as over 10% of the 
English market by 2010 and 20% by 2015. It has similar goals for Italy and the Czech 
Republic. Conceived as a way of protecting its market share at a time of institutional change 
in its main export market, this strategy has a number of important characteristics.  
 
Until the start of the 2000s, this industrial policy was based on cooperation between Gazprom 
and its traditional European clients, rather than on competition. The company set up joint 
ventures in gas transmission, marketing and trading, but for the main part these were with 
incumbent operators, who had signed long-term contracts (OMV, GDF, SNAM, ENI, etc, cf. 
Table 1)3. 
 
Table 1: Main Gazprom joint ventures with EU partners (late 2007) 
 
Countries Joint venture % ofGazprom 
 
Nature of operations 
Wingas 
(Wintershall/BASF) 
50 since 2007 Transportation and 
sales 
Germany 
WIEH 
(Wintershall/BASF) 
50 Sales and marketing 
Austria GWH (with OMV) 50 Marketing et trading 
Gasum (Fortum, E. ON 
Ruhrgas) 
50 Distribution  
Finland 
North Transgas OY 50 Transportation 
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France Fragaz (GDF) 50 Distribution and 
trading 
Greece Prometheus Gas 50 Marketing 
Panrusgaz (Mol) 40 Marketing and 
distribution 
Borsodchem 25 Petrochemistry 
Hungary 
DKG-EAST Co. Inc 38 Marketing and trading 
Italy Promgaz (SNAM, 
Edison) 
50 Marketing et 
distribution 
EuroPolGaz (PGNiG) 48 Transportation (Yamal 
pipeline) 
 
Poland 
Gaz Trading (PGNiG) 16 Marketing and trading, 
gas and LNG 
Gas-Invest 37,5 Marketing, distribution 
and trading 
 
Czech Rep 
Vemex 33 Trading 
Slovakia Slovrusgaz (E.ON) 50 Transportation and 
marketing 
Switzerland WIEE (Wintershall) 50 Marketing 
 
 
In comparison with this classic approach, other organisational methods have been developing 
since the start of the 2000s. They involve creating marketing subsidiaries in certain European 
countries4 and/or buying minority or majority shares in local companies (cf. Table 2). This 
latter method has thus far been quite limited, except in Central and Eastern European 
countries and the Baltic States (and CIS countries). But if developed on a large scale, 
industrial policies like this could destabilise relations previously established between 
Gazprom and its traditional clients insofar as this type of approach involves a certain amount 
of competition with incumbent operators, the traditional clients of the Russian company. Such 
methods are also often perceived as a threat to the energy security of Europe, not least 
because of the Russian State’s share in Gazprom’s capital (51% share)5. However, the 
Commission has shown its determination to introduce a third gas directive that among other 
things would order ownership “unbundling”, effectively prohibiting gas supply companies 
from integrating downstream. This could thus call into question the type of strategies adopted 
by Gazprom and upset the present balance. 
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Table 2: Gazprom’s main acquisitions among its European Union partners and its main 
subsidiaries in the EU (end of 2007) 
 
Countries Company 
Austria Gazprom will have right to sell directly to customers through 
subsidiary GWH and Centrex (25% held by Gazprom) 
Hungary Acquisition of share in E.ON Foldag Storage and E.ON Foldaz and in 
regional gas and electricity suppliers as part of a deal with E.ON 
concerning its holdings in MOL 
Italy Possibility of acquisition of 10% stake in ENIpower with direct sales 
of gas for electricity production 
Acquisition of share in gas distributor Pennine Natural Gas (PNG)  
Acquisition of gas distribution company NGSS (Natural Gas 
Shipping Services) 
United Kingdom 
Gazprom Marketing and Trading, Gazprom subsidiary enabling 
Gazprom to sell Russian gas directly in the UK 
Estonia Acquisition of share (37.5%) in marketing and transmission company 
Eesti Gaas 
Latvia Acquisition of share (34%) in marketing and distribution company 
Latvijas Gaze 
Acquisition of share (30%) in transmission and distribution company 
Stella Vitae 
 
Lithuania 
Acquisition of share (37%) in marketing and transmission company 
Lietuvos Dujos 
Source: Locatelli, C. (2007). 
 
- Export channels policy 
 
Gazprom has accompanied this strategy of downstream integration by a policy to increase 
transmission capacity, and this for two main reasons: to expand and secure export channels to 
Europe. Currently, Gazprom’s transmission capacity to Europe is of the order of 145 Bcm, 
divided between two main pipelines, the first through Ukraine and the other through Belarus 
(the Yamal I). The Blue Stream, under the Black Sea, provides a further 16 Bcm capacity. 
Russia’s two main projects designed to expand and secure its export routes are the Nord 
Stream and the South Stream. The first is well under way and should be operational by 2010. 
This project follows an agreement concluded in 2005 between Gazprom, BASF and E.ON6. 
The Nord Stream will be the first Russian gas pipeline to reach Europe without passing 
through any other country, since its route will take it under the Baltic sea to Germany. The 
South Stream project, although as yet in its early stages7, is expected to increase Gazprom’s 
export capacity by a further 30 Bcm on completion in 2011, when it will deliver Russian gas 
directly to Bulgaria. From there, the pipeline will be divided into two branches, one to 
Romania, Hungary and Slovenia, and the other to Greece and southern Italy8. To complete 
these export routes to Europe, Gazprom has also acquired stakes in two interconnectors, with 
the explicit aim of reaching the UK market9. Gazprom could also buy a share in the 
Baumgarten gas hub in Austria10.  
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Given the often conflictual situations inherited from the Soviet era, Gazprom’s strategy to 
protect its export routes also includes attempts to acquire stakes in existing networks in the 
CIS. With this aim in mind, Gazprom tried to negotiate with Ukraine and Belarus, offering to 
cancel their gas debts in exchange for a majority stake in their gas pipeline companies. Their 
attempts failed as far as Ukraine was concerned but they achieved a certain success with 
Belarus in 2007.  
 
1.2 Commercial strategies: what would be the Gazprom’s contracts portfolio? 
 
The second major element of Gazprom’s strategy relates to the definition of its contracts 
portfolio. While gas market liberalisation in Europe has given suppliers new marketing 
options (in particular sales on spot markets and short-term sales), it has also led to changes in 
long-term contracts. These may concern the duration of contracts11 or may involve the 
removal or modification of certain important clauses (final destination clause and price 
indexation clause12). Other changes may allow for greater flexibility concerning the quantities 
of gas actually delivered (Take or Pay clause) (Chevalier, Percebois, 2007). 
 
Gazprom is thus faced with the classic dilemma of any gas supplier, that of finding the right 
balance between volumes and prices. Thus, a policy of capturing market shares through spot 
trading and short-term sales could, if implemented on a large scale, pull prices downwards. 
Furthermore, the conditions of Russia’s domestic gas market, where prices contribute very 
little to the gas company’s profitability, justify Gazprom’s preference for long-term contracts. 
Such contracts are necessary to fund the huge investments that will be needed to develop new 
production areas. They provide Gazprom with the guarantee of profitable long-term outlets on 
the European market. Without these outlets, low gas prices within Russia would not make it 
economically viable to develop new gas fields, where production costs would be considerably 
higher than in the past. 
 
Faced with this situation, Gazprom can sell gas on spot markets, as it has done at different 
times in the UK in order to benefit from prices that are higher than contract prices. In this 
particular case, this is a “new” market with which Gazprom is not bound by any long-term 
contract (thus eliminating any form of competition). Aside from a few individual cases, 
Gazprom is planning for the main part to maintain its system of long-term contracts for its 
sales to Europe. Agreements signed recently with GDF, E. ON-Rurhgas, ENI, OMV AND 
RWE Transgas, to name just a few, bear witness to this strategy (cf. Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Main long-term contracts signed between Gazprom and European gas operators 
Between 2005 and 2007 
 
Country  Company Term of 
contract 
(signature) 
Amounts Extension/ 
new contract 
Comments 
Germany E.ON 
Ruhgas (1) 
2011-2036 
(2006) 
100 Bcm New By Nord Stream 
Germany E.ON 
Ruhgas (1) 
2020-2035? 
(2006) 
300 Bcm Extension   
Germany E.ON  2009-2020 
(2005) 
 Extension  
Germany  WIEH 2014-2031 
(2006) 
90 Bcm Extension  
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Austria OMV (1) 2012-2027 
(2006) 
7,5 Bcm/y Extension 25% marketed by two 
companies, Centrex and GWH 
controlled respectively at 50% 
and 100% by Russian interests 
Bulgaria  Bulgargaz 
(1) 
2011-2030 
(2006) 
3 Bcm/y New  
Danmark Dong 2011-2030 
(2006) 
1 Bcm/y New By Nord Stream 
Italy ENI (1) 2017-2035 
(2006) 
22 Bcm/y Extension In parallel, ENI has agreed 
that Gazprom can sell 3 
Bcm/yr directly to Italian 
customers (2) 
France GDF (1) 2017-2030 
(2006) 
12 Bcm/y Extension From 2010, there will be an 
additional volume of 2.5 
Bcm/yr (NordStream). 
Gazprom will be able to sell 
1.5 Bcm/yr directly on the 
market. 
Czech rep RWE 
Transgaz (1) 
2014-2035 
(2006) 
9 Bcm/y Extension  
Czech rep Vemex 2008-2012 
(2007) 
0,55 
Bcm/y 
New Option to extend for 5 years. 
(Vemex, marketing company 
in which Gazprom has 33% 
share) 
Romania WIEH 2012-2030 
(2005) 
4,5 Bcm/y Extension  
Notes (1): incumbent operator; (2): The agreements signed are aimed at defining a partnership based on asset 
swaps between ENI and Gazprom: 10% stake in ENIPower in exchange for shares in a gas field and the creation 
of a joint marketing company in exchange for a stake in a gas field. 
Sources: Tonje., De Jong (2007) ; Finon, Locatelli (2006) ; “Gazprom starts to compete against its own long-
term contracted supplies in the Czech downstream market”, Gas Matters, novembre-décembre 2007, p. 24-25. 
 
 
1.3 Some limits to defining a new gas strategy  
 
Gazprom’s strategy of getting into the downstream chain could come up against a certain 
number of limits and constraints. At the very least, it creates a dilemma peculiar to the gas 
company in that, if it is developed on a large scale, it could call into question its contractual 
relations with its traditional clients on European markets. The question of competition 
between long-term contracts and direct sales then becomes a crucial challenge, much like that 
of finding a balance between different types of contract so as not to destabilise the gas giant’s 
relations with its traditional clients. In the case of the French market, for example, it would be 
difficult for Gazprom to expect to maintain or even increase contracted volumes covered by 
Take-or-Pay agreements and at the same time aspire to a 10% direct share of the final-
consumer market, unless there were to be a strong rise in demand (i.e. a sellers market). 
Similarly, the medium-term contract signed with Vemex, a gas marketing company in which 
Gazprom has a 33% share, poses the same question with respect to the long-term contract 
signed with RWE Transgas, the former gas import monopoly in the Czech Republic. 
 
From this point of view, the agreement signed in 2006 between Gazprom and GDF can throw 
some light on this question and help with interpretation. In particular, this agreement will 
enable Gazprom to sell 1.5 Bcm/yr of gas directly to French consumers (GDF must transfer 
this amount back to Gazprom). Because of the quantities at stake, this type of agreement 
would not seem to have a particularly serious effect in terms of competition. Although the 
volume involved is fairly significant (10.3% of the contracted supplies from Gazprom), it 
 6
represents only a small percentage (2.3%) of GDF’s total gas sales to French consumers 
(approximately 66 Bcm). It is therefore highly unlikely that this strategy will destabilise the 
contracts concluded with GDF. A similar conclusion can be made concerning the agreement 
signed with the Czech Republic13. 
 
Given the importance placed by Gazprom on long-term contracts with its traditional partners 
and in light of recent changes in contractual arrangements, it would appear that Gazprom’s 
strategy of gaining a presence downstream will remain limited. In our view, only by acquiring 
stakes in incumbent operators could Gazprom implement a broad-reaching policy of 
downstream integration without calling into question existing contractual relations. As already 
mentioned, a development of this kind would, in the present context, seem difficult for the EU 
States to accept, with the exception perhaps of the special case of central and eastern 
European countries and certain former Soviet-bloc countries. Gazprom has thus been able to 
take part in the privatisation process of energy companies in particular in the Baltic countries, 
Bulgaria and Romania (but even in these cases, it has come up against resistance on many 
occasions14). 
 
- Access to resources in exchange for downstream assets? 
 
Perhaps, it is hard to imagine a downstream strategy being implemented on a large scale 
unless the Russian gas giant opens up its upstream operations to European companies. For its 
part, Gazprom has on a number of occasions shown its willingness to provide access to its gas 
resources in exchange for a presence in the downstream chain in Europe under bilateral deals. 
The agreement signed with BASF is a first example of such a situation (cf. Box 1). As far as 
the EU is concerned, the opening up of its suppliers’ gas sectors – in particular Russia’s - to 
foreign investors is an important variable in its energy policy in the context of energy market 
liberalisation. This has been expressed in the Energy Charter (and even certain aspects of 
discussions surrounding Russia’s accession to the WTO15). 
 
 
Box 1: BASF – Gazprom agreement 
 
The contract signed in 2007 between BASF and Gazprom concerns the entire gas chain, covering exploration-
production activities (in Russia) and transport and distribution (in Germany and certain other European 
countries). Under this contract, Wintershall (subsidiary of BASF) will receive a 25% stake minus one share in 
the Russian company Severneftegazprom which is developing the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field (with expected 
production capacity of 25 Bcm by 2009). In exchange, Gazprom will increase its share in Wingas from 35 to 
50% minus one share. In addition, Wingas Europe, a 50/50 joint venture between Gazprom and BASF, is to be 
created to market Russian gas in Europe. 
 
Sources : Pétrostratégies, 9 novembre 2007 ; “Gaz : le tandem Gazprom-Wintershall se dirige vers des ventes 
de gaz de 50 Gm3/an en Europe”, Pétrostratégies, 9 avril 2007. 
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Misunderstanding and controversy remain between Russia and the EU on just how involved 
the European companies will be in the Russian upstream activities and the extent to which 
downstream activities in Europe will be opened up. It is clear today that the Russian State is 
more than ever determined to maintain direct control over its oil and gas resources. While we 
cannot talk about total closure of the Russian territory, it is clear that agreements are 
increasingly negotiated on a case-by-case basis with the highest echelons in the Kremlin, an 
example being the agreement between Gazprom, Total and StatoilHydro for the development 
of the Shtokman gas field. Furthermore, this agreement is surrounded by seemingly inevitable 
misunderstanding and ambiguity. Gazprom says that it owns 100% of the reserves and the 
natural gas production of Shtokman while Total states that it is in a position to own a share in 
the reserves16. 
 
1.4  Diversification of exports: a credible response to liberalisation of the European 
market? 
 
Institutional changes in the European gas market provide an incentive for the Russian 
company to try to diversify its exports, first in the direction of the Asian markets but also to 
the United States via an LNG chain. In the long term, it is quite possible to imagine a situation 
in which European markets will have to compete with Asian markets for Russian gas. But in 
the short term, such a choice would hardly be a credible response from Russia to the 
uncertainties created by gas market liberalisation in Europe.  
 
Gas could be exported to Asia via two principal routes17. The first would involve supplying 
China by developing gas fields in eastern Siberia, with the Kovytka field in the Irkoutsk 
region the first to go onstream, followed by the more remote fields in the Sakha republic 
(Chayandiskoye, Talakan). In this case, the areas that would supply Asia are relatively distinct 
from those that would supply the European market (western Siberia). Only the second option, 
the Altai development, which would involve supplying Asian markets from gas fields in 
western Siberia, would create real competition between Europe and Asia18.  
Numerous constraints make such diversification difficult to envisage in the immediate future. 
The adequacy of the reserves themselves is not an issue, even though lack of exploration in 
this region means that there is uncertainty regarding actual quantities19. However, gas 
pipelines would have to be built over very long distances (especially in the case of the western 
Siberian fields), necessitating substantial financial commitments. The principal limit however 
comes from China and how much it is prepared to pay for gas imports from Russia. China is 
reluctant to commit itself to long-term contracts that would be binding not only in terms of 
contracted volumes but also in terms of prices (price indexation clause). Although China’s 
internal prices have been raised considerably over the last few years, they are still not 
sufficiently high for China to be able to pay import prices comparable to those paid on the 
European markets20. It is European markets that are the most profitable for Gazprom, at least 
in the short term. Finally, there is the “Gazprom” institutional unknown factor. Although 
Gazprom has a monopoly over gas exports and is also coordinator of gas field development in 
eastern Siberia, it has thus far not been particularly involved in developing this area, with 
development licences for the main gas fields being in the hands of Russian oil companies. 
However, it is difficult to imagine that there could be any large-scale development in this 
region without greater involvement from Gazprom. The Russian gas company’s membership 
of the Sakhalin II consortium and its purchase of TNK-BP’s stake in the company that holds 
Kovytka’s development licence perhaps mark the beginning of fresh developments. 
 
II – Export strategies hampered by domestic market constraints  
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Institutional changes in the EU gas market have forced Gazprom to adapt its export strategies 
as far as this market is concerned. However, exports to Europe are affected by – and in the 
future may be even restricted by - conditions on the Russian domestic market. Despite the 
considerable changes over the last few years, Russia’s internal market can hardly be viewed 
as a genuine market where supply and demand are regulated by price fluctuations. With a 
large part of this market controlled by the classic tools of the planned economy, namely 
consumption quotas rather than prices, trying to assess domestic supply and demand is a 
difficult and somewhat hazardous exercise. Changes in supply and demand, like price 
fluctuations, are however the main factors which would define Russia’s export capacity in the 
medium term. 
 
2.1 Uncertainties surrounding future gas production  
 
The statement – made initially by V. Milov and then reiterated by the International Energy 
Agency and the European Union – that from 2010 Russia would no longer be able to meet its 
contractual obligations and satisfy domestic demand opened up the debate on the prospects 
for boosting gas production over the next ten years. By 2010 (Milov, 2005), Russia’s gas 
deficit should be of the order of 132 Bcm, which would seem to confirm forecasts given by 
the Centre For European Policy Studies, which gives a figure of 126 Bcm for this date (Riley, 
2006). But some of the assumptions that have been made might be open to question. This 
deficit is estimated on the basis of an export volume of 312 Bcm, comprised of 200 Bcm to 
Europe and 112 Bcm to the CIS (while Russia’s production levels are not very far off official 
estimates). This export volume seems considerable since it is higher than projected exports for 
2020 given by the Russian authorities in the long-term energy plan, which puts maximum 
exports for 2010 (all export areas together) at 225 Bcm, while for 2020 it estimates exports to 
Europe will not exceed 210 Bcm, even in an optimistic scenario. These export levels 
correspond to gas production that will vary in 2010 from 560 to 665 Bcm, depending on the 
scenarios considered, and from 610 to 730 Bcm in 2020 (cf. Table 4). The overall plan for 
developing the gas sector up to 2030, prepared by Gazprom and under discussion since 2005, 
puts forward a figure for gas output in 2010 of between 683 and 710 Bcm.  
 
Table 4 : Russian gas production perspectives 
 
   2010 2015 2020 2030 
Gazprom - 500 - - Scénario 
pessimiste Total - 580 - - 
Gazprom - 540 - - Scénario 
modéré Total - 660 - - 
Gazprom - 580 - - 
 
 
Sagen, 
Tsygankova, 
2006 Scénario 
optimiste Total - 740 - - 
Victor, Jaffe, 
Hayes, 2006 
 Total 712,4 804,8 1013,7 - 
Gazprom - - - - Scénario 
ssimiste pe Total 555-560 - 610 - 
Gazprom 530 540 530 - Scénario 
modéré Total 635 660 680 - 
Gazprom 550 570 590 - 
 
Long Term 
Energy Plan, 
2003 
Scénario 
optimiste Total 665 705 710-730 - 
Gazprom 546 - - 595  
Minimum Total 683 - - 789 
Scheme for the 
development of 
the gas sector,  Gazprom 556 - - 656 
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2007 Total 710 - - 922 
Gazprom 581 - - - Renaissance 
Capital, 2004 
 
Total 776 - - - 
Gazprom 550 - - - Milov, 2005  
Total 640 (2) - - - 
WEO, 2004  Total - - 800 - 
DOE, 2004   697 767 840 985 
(1) Without Far East and East Siberia Production 
(2) Without Central Asia supply 
Sources: World Energy Outlook 2004, AIE 2004, p. 292 ; “Russia’s gas supply commitments - Is there enough 
for everyone”, Gas Matters, July 2007, p. 21 ; Sagen, Tsygankova (2006) ; Milov (2005) ; Victor, et al. (2006). 
 
While certain variables might be open to question, the fact remains that in the medium term 
Gazprom is not planning any massive increase in gas production, with most of Russia’s rise in 
production being left to independent gas companies and Russian oil companies. If we take 
Gazprom’s own estimates, its production should stabilise up to 2010 (of the order of 550-570 
Bcm) and then only start to rise significantly from 2015 (610-615 Bcm), reaching and 650-
670 Bcm by 2020 (Gazprom, 2008). The wait-and-see attitude adopted by Gazprom in its 
strategy regarding investment in the renewal of existing reserves is at the heart of current 
debate. Until 2009-2010, the main satellite deposits (namely Zapolarnoye, Pestovoye and 
Tarkosalinskoye) of the three super deposits of Medevehze, Urengoy and Yamburg, where 
production has now reached its peak, will compensate for this decline in production. After this 
date, the scenarios are less clear.  
 
For Gazprom to maintain its current production level, it will have to add 70 Bcm of new 
production capacity by 2015 and 180 Bcm by 2020. The huge gas fields in Yamal province21 
(with Bovanenko, Kharesavey and Kruzenshtern the first to go onstream), the Barents sea 
(Shtokman) and eastern Siberia can provide the additional gas required, given the substantial 
reserves in these fields. It remains to be seen which zones Gazprom will place at the top of the 
agenda in its investment strategy. It has a number of choices: it could start by developing 
either the Yamal province fields (with potential production of 250 Bcm) or the offshore 
Shtokman field which could reach a maximum production of 94 Bcm. A third solution, less 
frequently considered though nevertheless mentioned, would be to give priority to developing 
the reserves in the Ob Bay and Taz regions in the Kara sea22. Officially, Gazprom’s priority is 
to develop the Bovanenko gas field in Yamal province, which is expected to produce 7.9 Bcm 
of gas by 2011.  
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Even so, recent developments concerning Shtokman, with the signature of an agreement 
between Gazprom, Total and StatoilHydro under which natural gas is expected to be onstream 
by 2010 and LNG by 2014, would suggest that the options are still open and choices not yet 
finalised despite the short time frame involved. For certain observers, Bovanenko is still a 
more credible short-term option than Shtokman23.  
 
These delays reflect the environment of uncertainty in which the Russian company has to 
make its investment decisions. These uncertainties concern not only its main export market, 
the European Union, but also its domestic market. There may be no need for any significant 
increase in Russian gas production. On one hand for the European market, the aim of 
liberalisation is indeed to create competition between several suppliers and thus, implicitly, to 
diversify the sources of EU gas supplies. In this respect, Gazprom can consider its outlets to 
be less stable, even less reliable, and depending on the types of contracts it has with importers, 
it may be moving towards commitments of a more short-term nature. In such circumstances, 
suppliers have to decide whether they need to significantly increase production. This line of 
reasoning can be carried even further. In a liberalised market, Gazprom could wield market 
power by limiting volumes, which would make it easier to keep spot prices high as well as 
those in new contracts (Finon, 2007). But given the company’s preference for long-term 
contracts, justified to a large extent by its inability to generate sufficient profits from its 
internal market, and also the slow pace of EU gas market liberalisation, there is no reason to 
assume that this is going to happen24. Needless to say, Gazprom cannot escape the uncertainty 
regarding its outlets as a result of market liberalisation. On the other hand this uncertainty also 
has an effect on its domestic market, with serious questions as to what might be the 
consequences of large-scale gas price reform. 
 
2.2 Price reform at the heart of Russia’s gas issues  
 
The speed with which reforms will be implemented, the extent to which prices will rise and 
the structure of the reformed market (with a regulated market and a “free” market) will 
determine changes in Russian gas supply and demand, and consequently the export capacity 
of this country. Let us not forget that, despite the economic reforms started in 1991, the 
Russian gas market is still characterised by low prices and cross subsidies and an energy price 
structure in which natural gas prices remain lower than coal prices. In 2006, regulated 
domestic wholesale prices charged to industrial consumers were on average 44$/1000 m3. In 
the residential sector, prices are much lower because of the cross subsidization by industrial 
tariffs, a practice of the planned economy. By way of comparison, the price of gas exported to 
the European market was on average $240/1000 m3 in 2006. Because of the low gas prices 
charged at home, Gazprom can hardly make a profit from this market, which in fact account 
for the majority of the company’s sales. For a production of 656 Bcm in 2006, 68.7% i.e. 451 
Bcm went to meet domestic demand25. Of this, 30% was sold to the industrial sector and 39% 
to the electricity sector26. Most of the demand for gas is covered by Gazprom’s production 
but the contribution of independent producers and Russian oil companies to meeting domestic 
needs is on the increase. In 2006, independents and Russian oil companies produced 61 Bcm 
of natural gas, most of it sold on the Russian market, given Gazprom’s monopoly over export 
pipelines. In such a situation where prices have little meaning, the Russian gas market is 
essentially governed by a system of consumption quotas, which basically corresponds to a 
system of rationing (cf. Box 2). In such conditions, gas supply must adapt to demand, which, 
unless there are massive price increases, is bound to rise considerable in a phase of strong 
economic growth. According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, domestic gas demand 
is expected to rise by 20% by 2010.  
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Box 2: Managing the Russian gas market by controlling quantities  
 
Quotas, which are fixed as a method of managing the natural gas market in Russia, are essentially 
negotiated between Gazprom and the major types of gas consumers, although there are no clearly 
defined principles (in particular contractual ones) regarding these quotas (1). Each year, Gazprom 
determines the quantity of gas that it will supply to each type of consumer at the regulated price.  
 
While most gas supplied to residential consumers is sold at regulated prices (long-term contracts with 
local distribution companies are possible), the same is no longer true for the industrial sector. A non-
regulated market is now developing alongside the regulated market, even though this parallel market is 
still largely controlled by Gazprom. Industrial consumers (and the electric power sector) who require 
gas in excess of their consumption quotas can buy additional supplies on a so-called “free” market at 
non-regulated prices. This market is supplied primarily by independent gas producers, Russian oil 
companies, and to a minor degree by Gazprom (marginal volumes). We thus have: 
- sales by independent producers and Russian oil companies at freely negotiated prices (10 to 20% 
higher than regulated prices) ; 
- sales on a gas exchange by Gazprom (5 Bcm) and independent producers (5 Bcm); 
- sales by Gazprom since May 2007 at prices negotiated bilaterally with electricity sector companies 
that wish to buy volumes in excess of the quotas negotiated in the 2007 gas balance and with new 
consumers. Close to 11 Bcm could be sold on this basis in 2008 (2). 
 
Consumption quotas are difficult and complex to negotiate, especially with the public authorities. 
They are linked to important social stakes but also to the industrial policies that the Russian State 
plans to implement. From this point of view, low energy prices give certain energy-intensive Russian 
industries a comparative advantage in export markets. 
 
Notes : (1) Ahrend, Tompson (2004) ; (2) “Russia starts to reform its internal gas market”, Gas Matters, octobre 
2007, p. 13-17. 
 
The gradual price increases envisaged by the Russian authorities, if they are really applied, 
could change this approach considerably. The overall objective is for parity (less excise taxes, 
export duties and transport costs) between Russia’s domestic gas prices and European prices 
from 2011 for the industrial sector, and from 2013 for the residential sector. The schedule for 
raising regulated gas prices adopted on 30 November 2006 provides for a rise of 15% in 2007 
and 25% in 2008. In 2009, prices could rise by two increments of 13% while 2010 will see a 
rise of 13% followed by a further 12%. However, it is difficult to say precisely what prices 
will be in effect in absolute terms in 2011, in particular because this approach of aligning 
prices with European prices can lead to considerable increases given that gas prices are 
indexed to oil prices in the price formulas used for long-term contracts. 
 
On the demand side, such price changes should create the economic incentives needed to 
persuade consumers to rationalise their gas consumption, which would necessarily slow the 
rate of growth in demand. The country’s long-term energy plan already provides for a 
relatively modest rise in demand for natural gas by 2020 with an average annual growth rate 
of 1.3%27. In this case, Russia could meet its domestic needs and still honour its contractual 
obligations without the need for a massive rise in gas production.  
On the supply side, a significant increase in domestic prices would be likely to encourage 
independent producers (such as Novatek and Northgaz) and the Russian oil companies 
(Surgutneftegaz, Rosneft, TNK-BP and Lukoil) to produce more gas than they are doing at 
present. At the moment, because domestic prices are low and because Gazprom’s export 
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monopoly prevents them from selling on the European market, these companies tend to limit 
their production, which in 2006 represented 16% of Russian gas production28. In the medium 
term, therefore, any large-scale development of gas fields with huge reserves such as those in 
Yamal might not be justified, for fear of creating a gas glut.  
 
- Without price increases, what room for manœuvre does Gazprom have?  
 
Development of the Yamal gas fields, where production costs will undoubtedly be much 
higher than those in western Siberia, will necessitate a rise in domestic gas tariffs (and/or a 
“secure european gas demand”). Without major price increases, it is unlikely that Gazprom 
will be able to secure a return on such investments on the internal market. Consequently, even 
to meet rising demand at home, there is no economic justification for developing gas fields of 
this type. This being so, Gazprom has two possible ways of making adjustments. First, it can 
make sure that it has a large volume of gas available from Central Asia (Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan), in addition to Russian gas production. For 2008, Russia has signed an agreement 
to purchase 50 Bcm of gas from Turkmenistan at a price of $100/1000 m3. In an agreement 
signed between Gazprom and the Turkmen president in 2003, these imports could rise to 80 
Bcm by 2010 and continue until 2028. The situation should become clearer with the signature 
of the agreements between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan concerning renovation of 
the gas pipeline network between Turkmenistan and Russia via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 
and also the construction of a new pipeline with a capacity of 30 Bcm, parallel to the first, and 
finally the renovation of the Central Asia-Center pipeline29.  
The second method of adjustment available to Gazprom concerns the way in which the 
domestic gas market is organised. For example, in a situation of low prices (below marginal 
cost for example), Gazprom might try to minimise its sales (Sagen, Tsygankova, 2006) and 
leave independent producers to make up the difference on parallel markets, thereby enabling 
it to reallocate part of domestic sales to the export market. Given the way the Russian gas 
market is organised, this is a realistic hypothesis for making adjustments through quantities. 
The quota system thus provides Gazprom with the possibility of negotiated rationing with 
major consumers and the industrial and electricity segments (Stern, 2006). (Any demand in 
excess of the quotas can then be satisfied on a free market at prices higher than those 
regulated by the state). This type of rationing by controlling quantities would enable Gazprom 
to meet its contractual commitments which, given its domestic situation, would remain a 
priority in its gas policy (even though to date Gazprom has always refused to arbitrate against 
the interests of its internal market)30. Such an approach could find support in the policies to 
replace gas with coal in electricity generation, something that is explicitly envisaged in 
Russia’s long-term energy plan. Given the present state of reforms and current uncertainties 
(especially political), making any sudden and substantial increase in prices improbable, this 
would seem to be a highly likely scenario. 
 
 
* * * 
 
The possibility of Russia exercising market power in the EU gas market is today not really a 
realistic threat. First, current conditions in a European gas market dominated by long-term 
contracts are hardly conducive to such a situation. Second, Russia has neither the production 
capacity (i.e. surplus capacity) nor the necessary flexibility in its export strategies. Only 
massive price rises on the domestic market would be likely to satisfy this second condition, 
for at least two reasons. A profitable domestic market would undoubtedly enable Gazprom to 
more easily envisage a redistribution of its sales between internal market and export market, 
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with the EU losing the priority status that it currently enjoys (Stern, 2007). This could prompt 
Gazprom to be more flexible with regard to its contracts in the sense that it might be less 
inclined to systematically defend long-term contracts and more inclined to develop short-term 
sales. At the same time, such price rises would guarantee the company a production capacity 
sufficiently high (surplus?) – either through reduced demand, or because the development of 
numerous fields would become worthwhile economically – to make flexible export strategies 
a credible option (increasing or reducing exports depending on spot market conditions). In 
fact, given its present production capacity, it appears highly unlikely that Gazprom has any 
real room to manoeuvre as far as its exports are concerned.  
Such changes would add credibility to the idea of Gazprom exercising market power in 
Europe but, given Russia’s dependence on revenues from hydrocarbon exports (as well as the 
state of development of spot markets in the EU), the company is hardly in a position to do this 
today. 
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Notes 
 
1 In Gazprom’s statistics, exports to the Baltic countries (4.9 Bcm) are included in the CIS zone. 
 
2.cf. “Russia : Gazprom official reaffirms reliability of gas supplies”, Cedigaz News Report, 46(40), 21 
décembre 2007, p. 11. 
 
3 Even the creation of Wingas did not fundamentally stand in the way of Ruhrgas (in other words create real 
competition) on the German market because of demarcation agreements that governed the German gas industry 
until 2000. Under these agreements, large areas were exempted from gas-gas competition.  
(cf. Finon, Locatelli, 2006). 
 
4 In particular Gazprom Marketing and Trading in the UK and Gazprom Marketing and Trading France SAS in 
France. 
 
5 The British government came out strongly against Gazprom’s professed or assumed aim of obtaining a stake in 
the UK’s Centrica. 
 
6 To build this gas pipeline, Gazprom, BASF and E.ON created a joint venture in which Gazprom has a 51% 
stake. Gasunie should join the consortium (9% stake) in exchange for assets in the Balgzand Bacton Line (BBL), 
a gas pipeline between the Netherlands and the UK. Its final capacity should reach 55 Bcm by 2013 (22.5 Bcm 
in 2011 and 22.5 Bcm in 2013). 
 
7 At the end of 2007, Gazprom and ENI signed an agreement to create a joint venture to build the gas pipeline. 
Gazprom will have a 51% share in the company. 
 
8 cf. “Gazprom, Eni sign South Stream deal”,  Argus FSUE, 23 novembre 2007, p. 10. 
 
9 Gazprom has a 10% stake in the interconnector between Zeebrugge and Bacton. In exchange for Gasunie 
receiving a share in NordStream, Gazprom will have an option to acquire a stake in the Balgzand Bacton Line 
(BBL), the interconnector between the Netherlands and the UK.  
 
10 cf. “Gazprom gets 50 % Stake in Austrian Hub”, The Moscow Times, janvier 2008, p. 7. 
 
11 A. Neumann and C. Von Hirschhausen observed that, since liberalisation, new supply contracts of five to eight 
years have been introduced. However, they remain marginal and concern production capacity already in place 
(cf. Neumann, Von Hirschhausen, 2004; Finon, Locatelli, 2006). 
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12 In certain cases, price formulae will include market prices for electricity as an element for pricing part of the 
gas supply, or prices for coal, which can replace gas in electricity generation. In a few years time they could 
include spot market prices in continental Europe, provided these markets are sufficiently liquid. Liberalisation 
will thus probably lead to changes to pricing formulae. 
 
13 Under a medium-term contract Vemex has agreed to purchase 0.5 Bcm of Russian gas between 2008 and 
2012, with an option to extend the contract for five years. This amount represents 5% of the Czech market. (cf. 
“Gazprom starts to compete against its own long-term contracted supplies in the Czech downstream market”, 
Gas Matters, November-December 2007, p. 24-25. 
 
14 cf. example of Romania. 
 
15 Some of these discussions concerned in particular the gas sector and the low gas prices practised in Russia. 
These prices could be viewed as indirect subsidies to the Russian industrial sector and thus as a form of 
dumping. 
 
16 cf. “Statoil fits the Bill for Shtokman”, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 5 novembre 2007, p. 4-5. 
 
17 On this point, see for example C. Locatelli, 2007. 
 
18 This is a proposed gas pipeline from the gas fields in western Siberia to China that would deliver 30-40 Bcm 
/yr. 
 
19 In the three potential production areas, the Republic of Sakha, and the Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk regions, 
proven and potential reserves are estimated at between 3.7 and 5.3 Tm3 (proven) and over 50 Tm3 (potential). 
(cf. Boussena, et al., 2006, p. 134).  
 
20 cf. “Russia misleads on China gas talks”,  Argus FSU Energy, 23 novembre 2007. 
 
21 In 2006, Gazprom announced that gas from the Bovanenko field will be onstream by 2011. 
 
22 cf. “Russia’s gas supply commitments-Is there enough for everyone”, Gas Matters, July 2007, p. 18-24. 
 
23 cf. “Shtokman gets green light”, Argus FSUE, 23 novembre 2007, p. 3. 
 
24 On these questions, see D. Finon, C. Locatelli, 2008. 
 
25 It is difficult to analyse Russia’s domestic gas consumption due to lack of information on the types of 
consumers that are supplied by the country’s independent gas producers and oil companies, whose production in 
2006 totalled 61 Bcm. 
 
26 Over 70% of Russia’s thermal power stations are gas-fired. 
 
27 In an optimistic scenario, Russia’s gas consumption will be 512 Bcm in 2020 and in a pessimistic scenario 
464 Bcm.  
According to A. Goldthau, these levels implicitly assume a significant improvement in the energy efficiency of 
this country insofar as it can be assumed that Russia’s economic growth rate over this period will be well above 
the 1.3% /yr expected rise in gas consumption (Goldthau, 2007). 
 
28 This output could vary between 194 and 266 Bcm in 2030 according to the gas sector general development 
plan for 2030. in Gas Matters, July 2007, op. cit., p. 21. But more optimistic estimates can be found. Thus, 
output might reach 150 Bcm in 2010 and 209 Bcm in 2015. cf. “Gazprom oversees growth in gas output by 
independent producers”, Gas Matters, August 2006, p.17-22. 
 
29 This is a gas pipeline built in the Soviet era from Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to 
Russia. Its capacity of 45 Bcm/yr should rise to 90 Bcm/yr. 
 
30 The policy to replace gas with coal in thermal power stations that the government intends to implement by 
2020 is part of this strategy.  
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